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Pay cycles and fuel price: a quasi experimental approach 
 
Angela S. Bergantino  Mario Intini   Jordi Perdiguero 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper studies the daily price fixing behaviour of the Spanish fuel stations. Using a 
difference-in-differences approach, we show that low-cost and independent operators take 
advantage of needier consumers. Their prices increase on the day the unemployed workers 
receive their subsidy from the government, whereas, on the same day, branded companies 
decrease their prices. Retailers, aware of this, raise the price when they know demand increases. 
This phenomenon emphasises the effect of pay cycles on consumer choices and their related 
economic impact. Findings are also relevant for Antitrust authorities which generally focus on 
the activities of major brands’ stations. 
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1. Introduction 
Fuel consumption is quite relevant, as it represents a large share of household expenditure and 
it is an input in most production processes all over the world. In the United States, in the last 
five years, households spent on fuel between 2,5 and 4% of mean income1. In terms of final 
consumption, in Europe 6,7% of household consumption expenditure is related to fuel and 
maintenance of personal transport. Italy, France and Spain are above the average with, the first 
two countries allocating 7,6% of overall family expenditure to this sector and Spain 7,2% 
(Eurostat, 2017).  
In a number of OECD countries, road fuel markets are considered competitive at the retail 
level, with price levels and volatility reflecting fundamental demand and supply factors and 
not lack of competition or anticompetitive conduct. However, there is concern that retail road 
fuel market prices can be distorted even in seemingly competitive markets (OECD, 2013). 
Historically, the attention of the antitrust authority has focused on the activities of the fuel 
operators of the major brands2. Less expected and, to the best of our knowledge, not yet present 
in the literature, are strategic or anticompetitive behaviours by the so-called low-cost, 
supermarket and independent fuel companies. In general, their presence has been considered 
very beneficial for the market. Documents of the antitrust authorities and research papers in 
various countries (Gonzalez and Moral, 2019) tend to assume a positive attitude with respect 
to these operators, emphasising their role in calming pricing dynamics and in serving a weaker 
segment of the population as opposed to that of major brand stations (with supplier control over 
price), which tend to match the market mode price (Eckert and West, 2005). Those operators 
are often defined as price levellers for the more “captive” consumers, i.e. those with lower 
income3. As Chandra and Tappata (2011) show, in fact, consumers could save as much as 5% 
by price shopping for fuel within 1-mile radius.  
If a key question for competition authorities is how to distinguish lawful from unlawful conduct 
in the absence of direct evidence of an agreement or to identify strategic behaviours among 
operators at the expenses of consumers, from a consumer point of view, it is important also to 
understand pricing behaviour of alternative operators in order to make the “right” choice. This 
                                                 
1 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, and U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
2 Several studies often document how big-brand gasoline companies agree with each other to take advantage of 
consumers and have a dominant position in the market. Among the others see: Clark and Houde, 2013; Eckert, 
2013; Perdiguero, 2010, 2012. 
3 According to the OECD (2013), the entrance of supermarkets in the retail road fuel market and the entry of 
small, independent retailers, has had a significant marked effect on prices. 
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is the more so, for the “weak” part of the population, i.e. those consumers that might be defined 
as “needy”. The low-income groups, in fact, are less mobile and might be more penalised by 
increases in prices, as their demand is relatively inelastic (Andreyeva et al., 2010). There is a 
wide body of literature concerning income and price elasticity of fuel which seems to agree 
that low-income classes have, in fact, a more rigid demand to both price and income variations. 
Consumption behaviour, in fact, is different among different classes of consumers. The 
driving households in the lowest income classes drive for their livelihood and essential 
mobility and, therefore, their fuel consumption is a bare necessity. Also, there is evidence in 
the literature, not specifically related to fuel consumption, that changes in disposable income 
in very short periods influence behaviour of low-income consumers, that, right after receiving 
their paycheck, increase expenditure considerably, especially on necessities (Berniell, 2018).  
In this paper we test the pricing behaviour of pump stations in presence of temporary 
potential demand shocks caused by a larger availability of disposable income for a specific 
segment of the population in a specific moment in time. Given the evidence of pay-cycles on 
consumer behaviour shown in other markets, we investigate whether fuel stations adopt 
strategic behaviour in price-fixing strategies.  We carry out this analysis using Spanish national 
data. In all of Spain, on the 10th of each month, the “subsidio desempleo” (unemployment 
benefit for Spanish citizens), is paid out to all the citizens that have a right to it. It is a national 
level policy, uniform in all the areas of the country and, thus, we are able to compare the 
behaviour of different types of retailers with respect to the same potential demand shocks. We 
aggregate pumps in four groups according to the type and separate also retailers located on 
motorways. We obtain five different groups. We analyse the behaviour of all pump stations 
and check whether different types of stations, with different pricing strategies, act differently 
in this specific day. In particular, we analyse retailers’ behaviour on the day the subsidy is paid 
out. The econometric analysis is carried out using a difference-in-differences estimation in 
order to determine whether there is a meaningful difference in prices when the subsidy is paid 
out. We consider as treated group the different fuel stations located in trunk or urban roads and 
as control group the fuel stations located on motorways. We find that, between the 10th and the 
other days of the month, low-cost and independent stations, from whom recipients of subsidies 
are more likely to buy for their lower prices, take advantage of the situation by increasing prices 
than other branded companies.  
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we outline the relevant 
literature and we briefly discuss the Spanish market case highlighting the petrol market 
characteristics and the unemployment subsidy policy. In Section 3 we present the data. In 
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Section 4 we explain the empirical approaches used, and in Section 5 we discuss the results. In 
the last section, we give some conclusions and a future research perspective. 
 
2. Literature and background 
2.1 Literature Review 
In the fuel market, characterised by physically homogeneous and undifferentiated products, 
competition is essentially based on pricing and fuel stations’ characteristics (location, services 
at the stations, shops, etc.). Consumers, generally, have an incentive to refuel at stations that 
minimize their costs. However, search costs and transaction costs, arising from a change of 
supplier, limit competition in the market and can lead to market prices higher than expected in 
a competitive environment.4  
Historically, there is evidence from OECD countries, that an increase in prices has a greater 
impact on the demand than a price reduction, and that demand is more responsive to an increase 
in income than to a reduction in income, but this is particularly so for middle-income classes 
and not for high- and low-income (Gately and Huntington, 2002). Wadud et al., 2009, with 
reference to the United States, show that there is income and price insensitivity to fuel 
consumption in the lowest income quintile. Empirical evidence of income effects in purchase 
decisions is found also in California, USA, where if the gasoline price rises, consumers re-
allocate their expenditures across and within food consumption categories, in order to free up 
income to maintain their gasoline expenditure levels: they offset the increase in fuel spending 
by reducing other expenses (Gicheva et al., 2008). Similar evidence is found, at European level, 
on French data. Cayla et al. (2011) looking at household expenditure data find that the poorest 
consumers do not reduce their fuel expenditure as their income decreases or as prices rise. Also 
for the richest consumers, when saturation is reached, nothing changes. It is the middle-income 
class that increases expenditure when their income increases. Overall, at worldwide level, as 
Havranek and Kokes (2015) demonstrate thought their cross-country meta-analysis, demand 
                                                 
4 The CNC's follow-up report on the automotive fuel market in July 2012 indicates search costs as a possible 
explanation for the asymmetries observed in the speed of retail price adjustments. In particular, for the Spanish 
market, "given the limited presence in the Spanish market of operators with ample opportunity to advertise their 
prices, as in the case of service stations in large commercial complexes, new installations of this type of operators 
can help reduce these research costs and consequently increase competition in the retail market, as well as other 
measures to promote the transparency of retail prices at service stations, such as encouraging the real-time access 
to service station prices from mobile devices would help reduce these research costs." A recent natural experiment 
conducted in the gasoline market, focusing on search costs, is the one written by Noel (2018). He establishes that 
an exogenous shock to price dispersion impacts the amount of consumer search.   
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for fuel is almost insensitive to changes in income in the short run and relatively insensitive to 
income in the long run, especially for lower income classes; the same for price changes5. Aklilu 
(2016) estimates the price and income elasticities for gasoline and diesel across 28 EU 
countries using data from 1978 to 2013. He finds that the diesel price elasticity for Spain in the 
short term is -0.142 (in line with 23 countries that fall in the range of -0.02 to -0.4)6. In Spain, 
after the 2007 crises, expenditures on gasoline and diesel fell at an average annual rate of 5% 
and 4.3%, respectively, with contraction of production-linked demand and available income, 
due to wage reductions and increasing unemployment (Bakhat et al., 2017). Availability of 
income, thus, seemed to affect consumption in Spain in times of economic crises.  
It remains interesting to see whether changes in disposable income in very short periods - i.e. 
within the month -, influences behaviour of income receiver, especially in the lower income 
classes, that cannot count on reserves, also outside of crises’ periods.  An extensive literature, 
mainly on USA based evidence, states that household expenditure raises immediately after 
income receipt (Stephens, 2006; Mastrobuoni and Weinberg, 2009), but at the microeconomic 
level, there is little empirical evidence about the sensitivity of the timing of household 
purchases to the timing of the reception of the income. As we have anticipated, among the few 
studies, Berniell (2018)’s asserts that household expenditure increases considerably after 
income receipt. She exploits two forms of exogenous variation in pay frequency and shows 
that those who are paid recurrently have flatter expenditure paths. Comparing this group with 
another one in which salary is paid with a different frequency in time, she finds that “low 
frequencies lead to a within month business cycle, when many workers are paid in the same 
dates, which in turn generates costly congestion in sectors with capacity constraints.” This 
shows that frequencies of payment are important because they affect the consumption pattern 
and have an impact in the market. In fact, “if infrequent payments lead to cycles in the 
expenditure of some households, this non-smoothing behaviour would translate into the 
aggregate economy, generating within-month business cycles if many of these consumers are 
paid at a low frequency and at the same time” (Berniell, 2018; page 2).  Stephens (2003, 2006) 
finds evidence of a purchasing cycle in two different populations: social security recipients in 
the United States and pay-check recipients in the UK, both of whom receive checks monthly. 
                                                 
5 To examine cross-country differences in the income elasticity of fuel demand, they include dozens of countries, 
but, since for most of them only a few estimates are available, they focused on the ones most frequently examined 
in the literature: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the USA. 
6 There is an extensive literature on diesel and gasoline demand elasticity. Among the others see: Espey, 1998; 
Graham and Glaister, 2002; Ajanovic et al., 2012; Dahl, 2012. 
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For both groups, he finds that spending on instantaneous consumption (fresh food, food away 
from home, entertainment) increases following income receipt. Hastings and Washington 
(2010), using grocery store data for California, show that benefit recipients do relatively more 
of their food shopping at the beginning of the month (day on which benefits are distributed).  
Moreover, they find a sharp decrease in benefit households’ food expenditures of 20% from 
the first to the second week of the month and continue to decline less steeply through the 
remainder of the month. From week one to week four, benefit households reduce their 
quantities purchased by 32%. There are, thus, evidences of expenditure behavioural patterns 
due to income availability for lower income classes. None of these studies, however, analyse 
spending behaviour with respect to fuel demand and, more importantly, no studies verify the 
reaction of sellers to the behaviour of consumers. In other words, to the best of our knowledge, 
no analysis has been carried out to determine strategic behaviour of sellers in presence of a 
within-month business cycle due to income receipt for low-income classes. We think this is 
particularly relevant especially with reference to a specific type of good, which could be 
considered homogeneous and widely supplied on the territory. 
 
2.2 The Spanish market cases 
Liberalisation of the market, introduced in Spain in 1995, has increased the number of fuel 
stations by more than 70% (Bernardo, 2018). This significant increase has had an impact also 
in the composition of operators, with independent and unbranded companies becoming the 
third most important group after Repsol and Cepsa, already in the years following the reform7. 
The liberalisation of the market, in fact, has benefitted greatly low-cost companies, unbranded 
petrol stations and supermarket chains and has increased choice for consumers. Major players 
have been forced to gradually reduce the number of owned fuel stations in order to avoid 
monopolistic practices. In 2019, the number of active fuel stations in Spain was 11.609 
(Statista, 2019), an increase of 1% with respect to last year. Repsol and Cepsa have maintained 
their advantage with 3,350 and 1,522 petrol stations, respectively. Table n.1 summarises the 
composition of the markets.  
 
                                                 
7 On the immediate impact of the reform on the composition of the retailers see: Bello et al. (2007) and Bello et 
al. (2008). 
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Table 1. Market shares of fuel stations in Spain. 
Brand Stations (n) Percentage (%) 
Repsol 3,350 28.86 
Cepsa 1,522 13.12 
BP 747 6.44 
Disa 578 4.98 
Galp 570 4.90 
Avia 186 1.60 
Meroil 152 1.30 
Ballenoil 106 0.91 
Saras 90 0.78 
Others 4.308 37.11 
Total 11609 100 
 
However, the alternative players are about 33% of the country's fuel station network, with 3,941 
locations, an increase of 4,5% with respect to the previous years. According to data from the 
Annual Report of the Spanish Association of Oil Product Operators (AOP, 2019), non-historic 
oil companies have 2,995 outlets, 5.6% more than the previous year; hypermarkets and 
supermarkets operate 375 outlets, 2% more; finally, cooperatives run 571, 0.8% more than 
previous year. Spain is now the fourth for number of stations among European OECD 
countries.8 A relevant aspect for our study is the location of pump stations. The largest number 
of branded gas stations is concentrated in urban centres, main roads and motorways, while 
independent stations, supermarkets and low-cost stations are mainly localised in the suburbs 
and in the outskirts of the cities9. Given the urbanisation patterns of Spanish cities, these are in 
the peripherical areas of the territory. Different fuel companies choose to localize according to 
the target (and personal income) of the final consumers. Buying from low-cost fuel stations 
means spending less because of the cheaper price but it might cost more in terms of 
transportation costs: people with high income and high value of time make their purchases at 
branded stations, in the centre, while unemployed people, with low income, prefer to search 
for the fuel stations, charging the lowest price, usually in the periphery or near shopping centres 
and supermarkets where they go for shopping. 
                                                 
8 The first is Italy with 20.800 pumps, and before Spain there are: Germany (14.459) and Turkey (12.871). As 
analysed by several researchers such as Correljé (1990) and Perdiguero (2010), the Spanish fuel market is 
characterized by the presence of big companies that have always dominated the market.  
9 For a detailed analysis of the location of pumps the reader is referred to one of the apps that identify the pumps 
on the territory. Also, the study of Bello et al. (2008) contains a detailed description. 
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As we have anticipated, in Spain, workers that have lost their job receive the unemployment 
benefit or “subsidio desempleo”. This subsidy is delivered by the central Spanish government 
and it has exactly the same characteristics throughout the country. The amount of 
unemployment benefits depends on the salary received by the worker in the last six months. 
Specifically, unemployed people receive 70% of their salary for the first three months and 50% 
for the following months. The duration depends on the time the workers were employed in the 
last 6 years, limited to a maximum period of two years. This subsidy is received on the 10th of 
each month10. If the 10th day of the month corresponds to a Saturday, Sunday or bank holiday, 
the subsidy is received the next working day (11th or 12th).   
 
3. Data 
The data for Spain is readily available and homogeneous at the national level and, thus, 
represents a unique opportunity to verify our hypothesis. We also have pump-level daily posted 
prices for all the stations on the national territory, including their brand, type and geographical 
position, for a two-year period (1st January 2015 to 31st December 2016). These are millions of 
millions of daily prices observations. We can thus verify whether there are different strategies 
among different types of pumps’ operators, and whether it is always true that low-cost fuel 
pumps lead to greater benefits for consumers than branded stations in terms of both lower prices 
and lower exploitation of customers.  
We chose diesel prices to be analysed as the dependent variable, given the high percentage of 
diesel consumption compared to other types of fuel.11 The reference area covers the entire 
Spanish territory except the Canary Islands because they have a different organizational set-up 
and market share of large oil companies.12 We downloaded data for the different gasoline 
stations from the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism website, which 
provides daily prices and companies’ brand for each service station. We downloaded a database 
                                                 
10 There were approximately 63002 subjects who received the subsidy in 2015, 93361 in 2018. For details: 
https://www.cronista.com/economiapolitica/Desempleo-cobran-subsidios-117.000-personas-casi-el-doble-que-
en-2015-20190920-0047.html 
11 As noted by Gonzàlez-Marrero et al. (2012), there has been a “dieselisation process” all over Europe which, in 
Spain, has led to a change the motorization rates by type of fuel in favour of diesel cars (+9,2% as opposed to 
+2%). Diesel cars accounted for a minor part of the fleet at the beginning of the 1980s and nowadays represent 
more than 40% of the total EU fleet (Gonzàlez-Marrero et al., 2019). 
12 As observed by Jimenez and Perdiguero (2012), the gasoline market in the Canary Islands, presents relevant 
and different characteristics. In fact, depending on the islands considered gasoline markets could be a monopoly 
or an oligopoly. 
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of approximately 5 million observations. The various fuel distribution plants are identified by 
the Ministry through geolocation (latitude and longitude).  
We split the treated group into 4 categories, following the classification of the Commisiòn 
Nacional de Energia13 (2012). The first category includes “large companies” such as Repsol, 
Cepsa and BP and their various subsidiaries; the second category includes “traditional oil 
companies” such as Shell, Petrocat, Galp; the third category includes “independent stations” 
(individual, family, non-affiliated companies); the fourth includes “low-cost stations”, 
considering gas stations in supermarket/hypermarket areas (Carrefour, Eroski, etc.) and 
cooperatives. For the difference in difference approach we built Motorway as the control group 
which considers all the fuel stations located on free motorways and toll motorways. These are 
different from the previous four groups where only the fuel stations not situated in motorways 
are considered. The stations operating on motorways represent a valid control group since the 
pricing strategies adopted are not the same as the service stations located in the cities. The 
European Commission14 considers fuel retailing on motorways as a separate product market 
for different reasons. First, the fuel demand is captive, insofar as drivers rarely leave the 
motorways to buy fuel from a fuel station located off the motorway. Second, drivers travel on 
motorways for the possibility to go faster than other urban roads, and so are disinclined or less 
willing to waste time in refuelling. Furthermore, drivers on motorways typically do not know 
in detail the local fuel market off the motorway (as they often do not live nor work in the 
vicinity). And, more importantly, if the drivers have paid a toll that is not designed as linearly 
related to distance, this outlay serves as a further deterrent to their exiting the motorway in 
search of low-priced petrol stations on the adjacent roads. All these characteristics make the 
fuel stations on motorway different from those operating in urban context (Albalate and 
Perdiguero, 2015).  
Dummy10th is a dummy variable that corresponds to the 10th of each month in which 
unemployed people receive the subsidy. This dummy variable includes the days that 
correspond to the 10th of each month or to the first available weekday after the 10th of the month 
since the subsidy is not delivered on the weekends or on bank holidays. It is difficult, generally, 
to obtain data about consumption that affect pay cycles, because the payment decisions are 
treated like endogenous variables, but, in this article, the exogenous change depends on the day 
                                                 
13 For details: https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/1547584_8.pdf 
 
14 European Commission decisions on 29 September 1999 and 9 February 2000 regarding concentration 
operations affecting Exxon/Mobile and Total Fina/Elf, respectively.  
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of subsidy delivery. This exogenous variable is known by fuel stations, since the available 
money of those who have a lower propensity to purchase on other days of the month increases 
in this specific day. 
To observe the trend of prices over the week and to control for this effect, we built also a group 
of dummy variables to identify the different days of the week (Monday to Sunday), which take 
value 1 if the price corresponds to the specific day of the week, 0 otherwise.  
The Brent variable approximates marginal cost. It is the price of the crude oil that serves as a 
major benchmark price for purchases of oil worldwide. This variable is collected from 
Department of Energy of the US Government.15  
Furthermore, as a robustness check, we split the fuel stations operating in free and toll 
motorways. We created the Did Free Motorway variable, which reflect the effect of the policy 
on the stations operating on the free motorway. This variable is given by the interaction among 
the dummy10th variable and the free motorway group. The control group, in this case, is 
represented by fuel stations located in toll motorways. 
The summary statistics are shown in Table 2. The days of the week have different means 
implying that the dataset is unbalanced. It can happen that companies do not communicate the 
prices charged at the pump every day – especially at week-ends – or, more rarely, that we have 
not been able to download data from the Ministry website due to technical problems on the 
webpage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/ 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price 4,843,162 1.073 0.091 0.743 1.384 
Monday 4,843,162 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Tuesday 4,843,162 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Wednesday 4,843,162 0.144 0.350 0 1 
Thursday 4,843,162 0.151 0.358 0 1 
Friday 4,843,162 0.146 0.353 0 1 
Saturday 4,843,162 0.118 0.323 0 1 
Sunday 4,843,162 0.129 0.336 0 1 
Brent 4,843,162 0.309 0.055 0.175 0.426 
Motorway 4,843,162 0.031 0.175 0 1 
Dummygroup1 4,843,162 0.554 0.496 0 1 
Dummygroup2 4,843,162 0.123 0.329 0 1 
Dummygroup3 4.843.162 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Dummygroup4 4,843,162 0.055 0.229 0 1 
Dummy10th 4,843,162 0.034 0.182 0 1 
Free motorway  4,843,162 0.022 0.146 0 1 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
In Table 3 we observe that, on average, the Price variable is smaller the 10th day (1.066), 
while on the other days it has a larger value (1.072). The t-test shows that the average prices 
are significantly different from each other and that these differences are significantly 
different from zero.  
Our data reflects market data quite well as the market share of “branded stations” holds 
57% of the total, while low-cost companies 6%. These values are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Average Price 
Average price Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
On the 10th day 1.066 0.091 0.760 1.384 
On the other days 1.072 0.092 0.743 1.384 
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Table 4. Market share of fuel companies in Spain 
Group Share 
Group 1 (large companies) 0.57 
Group 2 (traditional oil companies) 0.12 
Group 3 (independent stations) 0.24 
Group 4 (low-cost stations) 0.06 
 
 
For our empirical analysis we use a panel fixed effect model. Since OLS assumptions are 
commonly violated in a data panel, there are serious risks about contemporaneous correlation 
and serial correlation. To diagnose the autocorrelation issue, we use the Wooldridge test. We 
reject the null hypothesis and assert that there is an autocorrelation problem, and so the errors 
are not independent. In the estimation we solve this problem for the two approaches.  
The first approach considers three different models and includes the following variables:  
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦10
𝑡ℎ + 𝛽2𝑇𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽4𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦  [1] 
+𝛽6𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Where:  
- 𝑃𝑖𝑡: is the diesel price; 
- Dummy10th: is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 10th day of the months where 
unemployed people receive their subsidy and 0 otherwise, for all the petrol stations; 
- Tuesday to Sunday: are dummy variables that identify the different days of the week; 
- Brent: is the price of the Brent oil per litre in t-1. 
In the three models we use regression [1], in the following way: 
1) In the first model, we analyse the sign and the numerical value of the price on the 10th 
of each month (Dummy10th) for all the fuel stations located in mainland Spain. With 
this analysis, we investigate the different weights of the days of the week in the price-
formation process. 
2) In the second model, we consider the same effect on the 10th of each month for fuel 
stations located in the national territory, excluding those that operate on motorways. 
3) In the third model, we consider only fuel stations that operate on motorways.  
13 
We expect to find significant and negative values of Dummy10th in the first and in the second 
model, while in the third one, we expect to find a non-significant value. If this occurs, it is 
possible to use this group as the control group in the difference-in-differences model. 
In the second approach (4th model) we apply the difference-in-differences estimation. Using 
this approach, we analyse the impact that a natural experiment has on a treatment group (the 
sum of the four different groups not located on motorways) in comparison to a control group, 
and we observe whether the impact is unaffected by the change. As seen by Lafontaine and 
Slade (2008), we have a natural experiment when three conditions are realised: the presence of 
an exogenous change in the market (Dummy10th), a group treated by the exogenous change 
(sum of the four Dummygroup variables), and one unaffected group, the control group (stations 
located on motorways). All of these conditions hold for our analysis. 
 
In particular, we use the following specification [2]:  
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝2 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝3 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝4.             [2]
+ 𝛽5𝑇𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽7𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦
+ 𝛽10𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Where: 
- 𝑃𝑖𝑡: is the diesel price; 
- Didgroup1, Didgroup2, Didgroup3, Didgroup4: represent the interactions between 
Dummy10th and each Dummygroup variable. The Dummygroup are dummy variables 
equal to 1 if the petrol station is related to groups 1, 2, 3 or 4 and are not located on 
motorways.  
- Tuesday to Sunday: are dummy variables that identify the different days of the week; 
- Brent: is the price of the brent oil per litre in t-1. 
In this model we consider fuel stations that are not located on a motorway.  
This approach is useful to show the price variation in the control group (companies located on 
motorway) and in the treated group. The control group must be as similar as possible to the 
treatment group in terms of demand and supply shocks.  
In this study, these conditions are fully respected. The strength of this method is the high 
flexibility and the easy implementation of variables in the estimates. A test for the common 
trend assumption is needed to reinforce the argument for the use of the difference-in-difference 
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approach. To this end, figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the common trend 
characterizing the treatment and the control group, for each group considered in the analysis. 
A change in the price-trend occurs in correspondence of the 10th of the month for the two years, 
differently, in the other days, the common trend is respected.  
 
Figure 1. Common Trend Analysis 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Results 
At the beginning of this analysis, we consider the average prices between groups the 10th of 
each month and in the other days (Table n.5). The major stations’ group (first group) has an 
average price that is greater than the others. The price difference between the largest branded 
retailer and the low-cost operators is, on average, 0,084 euro. Despite the fact that the product 
is not perfectly homogenous among fuel stations, for different locations, brands, quantities and 
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qualities offered, this gap could explain why unemployed people prefer to refuel at low-cost. 
This difference in price is confirmed also if we look at the prices charged on the 10th of each 
month. The first two groups, in fact, charge a higher price than the other groups (3 and 4). 
These prices, however, are lower than the average value for the two groups. 
 
Table 5. Structure of Spanish prices in the fuel market by groups 
Group Price Mean price Std. Dev Min Max 
Group 1 
average price 1.091 0.085 0.759 1.379 
average price on the 10th 1.084 0.086 0.796 1.347 
Group 2 
average price 1.068 0.089 0.796 1.340 
average price on the 10th 1.062 0.088 0.796 1.340 
Group 3 
average price 1.042 0.091 0.768 1.384 
average price on the 10th 1.039 0.091 0.768 1.384 
Group 4 
average price 1.007 0.094 0.76 1.336 
average price on the 10th 1.007 0.091 0.76 1.336 
Motorway 
average price 1.095 0.084 0.82 1.339 
average price on the 10th 1.084 0.085 0.845 1.309 
 
Before starting with the estimations of the first approach, we introduce the different variables 
one at a time, to understand the relationship between each group of variables (Brent, days of 
the week, dummy10th) and the dependent variable. Results for Model 1 are reported in Table 
n.6.  
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Table n.6 Variables specifications in Model 1 
  Dependent variable: Price 
    1   2   3   4 
    Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate 
Intercept   1.09309***   1.09363***   1.09661***   1.09447*** 
    (0.00004)   (0.00004)   (0.00002)   (0.00004) 
Dummy10           -0.00016*** -0.00008*** 
            (-0.00001)   (0.00001) 
Tuesday       0.00030***       0.00029*** 
        (0.00001)       (0.00001) 
Wednesday       0.00029***       0.000278*** 
        (0.00001)       (0.00001) 
Thursday       0.00028***       0.00027*** 
        (0.00001)       (0.00001) 
Friday       0.00034***       0.00030*** 
        (0.00001)       (0.00001) 
Saturday       0.00027***       0.00024*** 
        (0.00001)       (0.00001) 
Sunday       0.00017***       0.00014*** 
        0.00002       (0.00001) 
Brentlitro   0.01089***        0.00847*** 
    (0.00047)           (0.00048) 
 
  
            0.6003 
R2 Overall  0.63   0.1   0.02   0.6 
F test   523.16   283.09   122.62   254.9 
Observations   4,967,470   4,843,162   4,967,470   4,843,162 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
  
 
We omit to report stepwise results for Model 2 and 3 as they are coherent with those of Model 1. 
Full models for the three specifications of the first approach are reported in Table 7. We observe 
that the variable Brent affects the price positively in all the three models. A further common 
feature is related to the days of the week. We observe that they always affect the price positively 
compared to Mondays, and that this effect is larger in the first part of the week and it decreases 
during the weekend. Monday is, thus, the cheapest day of the week. This result is in line with 
Jimenez and Perdiguero (2013). They show that on Mondays the price falls more than the other 
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days of the week and that this “Monday effect” creates some distortions in the rank position of 
Spain in European statistics. 
The Dummy10th variable is the most important for our analysis. We observe that the 10th day 
of the month, in Spain, has a negative and significant sign in models 1 and 2. In the first 
estimation, there is a reduction 0.00009 on the price of the 10th day, and in the second one there 
is a reduction of 0.00008. In both cases coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Considering our dataset, with about 5 million observations, and the very good fit of the model, 
we can state that the price of diesel decreases on the 10th day of each month.  
A relevant observation also stems from model 3. In this model we consider the fuel stations 
located on motorways and we observe that the variable Dummy10th is negative but not 
significant. This is expected as most people who are unemployed are unlikely to use motorways 
for both driving and refuelling. This is a good result for our analysis because it shows that the 
behaviour of fuel stations located on a motorway is not affected by the unemployment subsidy. 
In order to meet the conditions of a natural experiment, in fact, the control group must not be 
affected by the treatment.  
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Table n.7 Results of the first approach 
  Dependent variable: Price       
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
    Estimate   Estimate   Estimate 
Intercept   1.09447***   1.09364***   1.13498*** 
    (0.00000)   (0.00000)   (0.00002) 
Dummy10th   -0.00009***   -0.00008***   -0.00014        
    (0.00001)   (0.00002)   (0.00009) 
Tuesday   0.00029***   0.00029***   0.00037*** 
    (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00005) 
Wednesday   0.00028***   0.00028***   0.00020*** 
    (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00006) 
Thursday   0.00027***   0.00026***   0.00038*** 
    (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00007) 
Friday   0.00031***   0.00029***   0.00068*** 
    (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00006) 
Saturday   0.00024***    0.00024***   0.00038*** 
    (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00006) 
Sunday   0.00014***   0.00014**   0.00023*** 
    (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00005) 
Brentlitro   0.00848***   0.00915***   0.00682**   
    (0.00049)   (0.00050)   (0.00279) 
 
Overall  
 
  0.6003   0.6039   0.5783 
F test   254.90   246.63   21.66 
Observations   4,843,162   4,688,649   154,485 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Model 1=general model; Model 2=motorway==0; Model 3=motorway==1. 
Source: Own estimation 
 
In the second approach, we consider the difference-in-differences methodology (Table n.8). As 
stated before, the “DIDgroup” variables are the result of the interaction of the Dummy10th and 
each affected group dummy. The affected groups are represented by different types of fuel 
retailers that are not located on motorways. Specifically, we observe that the “large companies” 
(DIDgroup1) reduce the prices on the 10th of each month by approximately 0.00029 euro more 
than traditional operators, with a 1% level of significance. Surprisingly, the third group, i.e. the 
independent gas stations (DIDgroup3) has the largest increase in price. This group, in fact, 
increase their price on the 10th day of the month by 0.00022, followed by the “low-cost fuel 
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stations” (DIDgroup4) which increase the price of 0.00020. Consistently with previous 
estimates, the Brentlitro variable affects positively the fuel price. 
As already explained (Table n.4), the “large oil companies” represent the group with the largest 
market share in the fuel market (57%)16. It may thus seem a contradiction that these operators 
are those that decrease the prices on the 10th of the month. Unemployed people, who are the 
beneficiary of the subsidy, are, however, a specific part of the market. They choose independent 
and low-cost companies, mainly for two reasons.  
The first reason is that the price can be, on average, on any given day, lower than that of other 
companies. We interpret this unexpected price reduction adopted by major stations as a form 
of incentive to attract people on low incomes. A credible argument lies in the "supply-demand" 
law: if demand increases, companies tend to raise prices.  
The second reason is related to the value of time17. The best and most easily accessible places 
are occupied by major companies while independent and low-cost petrol stations are not 
located in the city centre. Grant recipients, by definition, do not have a full-time job or 
employment, so they have more time than other individuals. This means that if a consumer is 
poor and unemployed, he/she has more time and cares more about prices than other consumers, 
so the likelihood of choosing to refuel in a low-cost company is greater. The time variable 
strongly influences consumer behaviour. Evidence shows that when unemployed people 
receive their monthly amount of money, low-cost fuel and independent retailers increase the 
price, whereas major companies set a lower price. Specifically, we obtain evidence pointing to 
a strategic behaviour of low-cost pump stations. They seem to exploit needy consumers by 
relying on their "habit" of finding lower prices. Moreover, major petrol stations have the 
opposite strategic behaviour. They reduce prices in order to gain a share of consumers with a 
greater "temporary" availability of money.  
As a robustness check, we have developed a last model with which we test the effect of the 
policy on all four groups and on stations operating on the free highway, using toll motorway 
stations as control group. As we expected, the results are significant and positive for the 
different groups (except group 1) and negative but not significant for the free motorway group. 
These additional results (reported in the Appendix) confirm our previous findings.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Our data is representative of the Spanish gasoline market since, according to BCG y CNE (2012), the major 
oil companies account, in Spain, for 60% of the market. 
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Table n.8 Results of second approach 
 
       Dependent variable: Price 
  Model 4 
  Estimate 
Intercept   1.09364*** 
    (0.00000) 
DID Group 1   -0.00029*** 
    (0.00002) 
DID Group 2   0.00012*** 
    (0.00004) 
DID Group 3   0.00022*** 
    (0.00003) 
DID Group 4   0.00020*** 
    (0.00006) 
Tuesday   0.00029*** 
    (0.00001) 
Wednesday   0.00028*** 
    (0.00001) 
Thursday   0.00026*** 
    (0 .00001) 
Friday   0.00029*** 
    (0 .00001) 
Saturday   0.00024*** 
    (0.00001) 
Sunday   0.00014*** 
    (0.00001) 
Brentlitro   0.00915*** 
    (0.00050) 
 
Overall  
 
  0.5943 
F test   201.42 
Observations   4,688,649 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Source: Own estimation 
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6. Conclusions 
This article analyses the behaviour of fuel stations in Spain to see if their pricing strategy is 
influenced by exogenous factors, i.e. increased availability of income. While the attention of 
the antitrust authority is increasingly focused on the activities of the major brands of oil 
companies and their service stations, our hypothesis is that the behaviour of service stations is 
differentiated, and that independent and low-cost service stations also discriminate against their 
consumers. 
Many studies point out that low-cost companies apply lower prices and offer more favourable 
services to consumers (Hastings, 2004; Bergantino et al., 2018; Bernardo, 2018). Our results 
are consistent with these findings. In general, the prices of independent and low-cost operators 
are, in fact, lower than those of large brand stations. We note, however, that there is a specific 
effect on prices. In particular, independent retailers and low-cost companies increase their 
prices on the 10th of each month, while brand companies decrease their prices on this day. We 
find evidence that the former stations discriminate price when consumers in need have more 
disposable income. We therefore find indirect evidence of the so-called payment cycle problem 
in the fuel market. In line with the issue of payment cycles, in fact, it could be that there is an 
increase in demand for low-cost pumps, as drivers on unemployment benefit - more price-
sensitive than generic consumers - generally refuel at stations that, on average, offer lower fuel 
prices during the rest of the month. Beneficiaries of the benefit are generally not recurring 
buyers and low-cost retailers benefit from their reputation. These same operators continue to 
be convenient for their regular consumers. Their prices are on average lower than those of 
branded stations. However, they take advantage of the temporarily higher income available to 
needy consumers and differentiate their prices accordingly. Branded stations, which on average 
sell their products at higher prices, are lowering prices on this particular day in order to attract 
more unemployed consumers to use their service stations.  
These findings may have significant implications for the regulation of the fuel distribution 
market and may suggest the application of tailor-made policies for different types of operators. 
Low-cost fuel stations are increasing their presence in the European market, but few articles 
analyse in detail their pricing strategies. We fill this gap.  
Future research should focus on increasing the number of years of observations in the analysis 
(according to the available data), and also on considering individual regions of Spain with 
different unemployment rates to observe how the heterogeneity of the unemployment rate 
affects operator's pricing behaviour. Further analysis could also focus on petrol prices to see 
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whether price patterns are similar between different fuel types. Finally, other forms of payment 
(e.g. wages, pensions, etc.), with their specific timing, could be considered.  
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Appendix: Robustness check 
 
 Dependent variable: Price 
 Model 5 
 Estimate 
Intercept 
 
1.09415*** 
(0.00037) 
Did Group 1 
 
-0.00028*** 
(0.00002) 
Did Group 2 
 
0.00011***    
(0.0004) 
Did Group 3 
 
0.00021*** 
(0.00003) 
Did Group 4 
 
0.00020*** 
(0.00006) 
DID Free 
Motorway 
 
-0.00009 
(0.00009) 
Tuesday 
 
0.00029*** 
(-0.00008) 
Wednesday 
 
0.00028*** 
(0.00001) 
Thursday 
 
0.00026*** 
(0.00001) 
Friday 
 
0.00031*** 
(0.00001) 
Saturday 
 
0.00023*** 
(0.00001) 
Sunday 
 
0.00014*** 
(0.00009) 
Brentlitro 
 
0.00873*** 
(0.00048) 
 
Overall R2 
  
0.59 
F test  188.34 
Observations  4,843,162 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Source: Own estimation 
 
 
